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Letter dated 29 September 2017 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with paragraph 29 of Security Council resolution 2317 (2016), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments to the delivery thereto.

I would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Kairat **Umarov**
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant
to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)
concerning Somalia and Eritrea

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Letter dated 11 September 2017 from the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea

In accordance with paragraph 29 of Security Council resolution 2317 (2016), I have the honour to transmit the requested report on the implementation of paragraphs 28 and 29 and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

The humanitarian community working in Somalia wishes to advise that, as with the previous 11 reports, it maintains the definition of "implementing partner" pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), which is as follows:

> "Implementing partner" — a non-governmental organization (NGO) or community-based organization that has undergone due diligence to establish its bona fides by a United Nations agency or another NGO and that reports when requested to the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia on mitigation measures. Implementing partners have the following characteristics:
>
> (a) The organization is part of the humanitarian response plan for Somalia (or the Somalia Humanitarian Fund) process; and/or
>
> (b) The organization is represented in a cluster's 3W matrix (*Who* does *What* and *Where*).

I remain available should you have any questions about the content of the report or need further clarification on the humanitarian situation in Somalia.

(*Signed*) Mark **Lowcock**
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and Emergency Relief Coordinator

Report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator

Introduction

1. The present report is the first submission pursuant to Security Council resolution 2317 (2016), the resolution succeeding resolutions 1916 (2010), 1972 (2011), 2060 (2012), 2111 (2013), 2182 (2014) and 2244 (2015), in which the Council established the reporting requirement. It is the twelfth submission pursuant to the above-mentioned resolutions. The Council, in paragraph 29 of its resolution 2317 (2016), requested the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report to the Council by 15 October 2017 on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments thereto.

2. The present report covers the period from September 2016 to September 2017. It focuses primarily on the delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected people in areas under the control or influence of Al-Shabaab, which was included on the sanctions list pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1844 (2008), by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, on 12 April 2010. As in the previous 11 reports (S/2010/372, S/2010/580, S/2011/125, S/2011/694, S/2012/546, S/2012/856, S/2013/415, S/2014/177, S/2014/655, S/2015/731 and S/2016/827), the present report outlines constraints to humanitarian access and operational implications. In addition, it summarizes mitigation measures established to address the risks of politicization, misuse and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance. The report is based on information synthesized in consultation with relevant humanitarian organizations active in Somalia and information from the Risk Management Unit in the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator for Somalia.

Humanitarian situation

3. The humanitarian situation in Somalia remains precarious owing to persistent climate variability, armed conflict, clan violence, insecurity, displacement and poor access to basic services. About 6.2 million people — almost half of Somalia's population — need humanitarian assistance. Of these, 3.1 million people are in "crisis" and "emergency" situation and are unable to meet their daily food needs. Women, children and displaced persons are particularly vulnerable to shocks and mass displacement has increased protection concerns. Gender-based violence remains rampant and the recruitment and use of children by armed forces or armed groups and cases of unaccompanied/separated children are on the rise, in particular in areas with high concentrations of newly displaced persons. So far, a large-scale famine has been averted as a result of generous contributions by Somalis themselves and donors, together with scaled-up innovative response efforts by the United Nations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society and the private sector. However, the threat of famine persists, with parts of south and central Somalia remaining at particular risk. The *gu* rainy season (April-June) was shorter than usual and overall rainfall was below average in most parts of the country. The combination of poor *gu* rains and continued armed conflict have increased humanitarian concerns in parts of Galmudug and South-West states. While the rains provided respite in some areas, pastoralists in many areas lost up to 60 per cent of their animals and crop yields are generally expected to be low. As a result, most rural livelihood zones of Somalia are classified as in "crisis" and "emergency" situation. The overall nutrition situation has continued to deteriorate, with "critical"

levels of acute malnutrition in 9 of 12 internally displaced persons settlements. The prevalence of global acute malnutrition in those settlements remains above the 15 per cent emergency threshold. About 388,000 children under 5 years of age are acutely malnourished, including more than 87,000 who are severely malnourished and require urgent life-saving treatment. The drought has had a devastating effect on many water sources, with many areas experiencing acute water shortages. An estimated 4.5 million people need water, sanitation and hygiene services countrywide.

4. Major disease outbreaks continue to be reported throughout the country, with nearly 76,000 cases of acute watery diarrhoea and 15,000 suspected cases of measles registered to date in 2017. Although the prevalence of acute watery diarrhoea/cholera and measles has continued to decrease, owing in part to the preventive humanitarian response, the outbreaks are not yet fully under control. The severe drought has also further exacerbated the displacement crisis throughout the country. From November 2016 to date, the drought, compounded by armed conflict, has displaced over 875,000 persons, mainly from rural areas to urban centres. The majority of the newly displaced persons have joined the 1.1 million Somalis living in protracted displacement in various settlements throughout the country. Continued advocacy is required to provide durable solutions for such persons, whose number could increase to more than 15 per cent of the population by the end of the year. Nomadic pastoralists who have lost all their livestock present a particularly challenging case in terms of "return" or local integration. The deepening drought has also resulted in the migration of more than 5,100 Somalis to Ethiopia and Kenya in search of better opportunities. At the same time, over 31,600 Somali refugees have returned from Kenya to Somalia in 2017.

Humanitarian response

5. Early actions of solidarity and generosity by donors enabled humanitarian partners to significantly scale up response efforts and avert a famine in the first half of 2017. With more than $900 million received in 2017, including $813 million towards the Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan, operational agencies have reached over 3 million of the targeted 5.5 million people with life-saving assistance and livelihood support since March on a monthly basis. The majority of the people have been supported through cash and vouchers. More than half a million children and women were treated for malnutrition in July alone, and 377,000 people were provided with access to safe water. Nearly 2.5 million people (or 75 per cent of those targeted) were reached with improved access to food in July and close to 2.9 million people (or nearly 80 per cent of those targeted) have benefited from the provision of livestock and agricultural support during the *gu* season.

6. The Federal Ministry of Health, with support provided by humanitarian partners, launched a measles vaccination campaign in April, targeting 110,000 displaced children under 5 years of age throughout southern and central Somalia, and 250,000 children in Somaliland. Another measles campaign is planned for November. In addition, two rounds of an oral cholera vaccination campaign were conducted in Mogadishu, Kismaayo and Beledweyne in March and April, targeting 450,000 people. According to health partners, preliminary results indicate over 90 per cent coverage in areas where the campaigns took place. However, measles and other viral respiratory infections, acute watery diarrhoea/cholera and malaria are likely to spread further with the onset of the *deyr* rains in October, in particular in congested internally displaced persons settlements, owing to poor sanitation facilities and insufficient access to safe water.

7. With rapid deployment of various mechanisms, such as the Drought Operations Coordination Centres set up in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Garowe with the aim to strengthen coordination of famine prevention efforts, massive scale-up of cash programmes and enhanced coordination with federal and regional authorities, humanitarian partners have made efficient and innovative use of the available resources to prevent famine. The humanitarian community has also scaled up its logistical response capacity. In collaboration with the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service, three cargo planes were positioned in Mogadishu to facilitate the airlift of critical humanitarian supplies. The Service also scaled up the availability of passenger flights by adding a passenger plane to its fleet that services southern and central Somalia. As a result, a total of six Service aircraft currently operate within Somalia, which makes possible the scale-up of the operational response and subsequent monitoring of the projects. In addition, prioritized logistical support has been provided for the drought response by the Federal Government of Somalia. Nevertheless, critical sectors are falling short of their target and additional resources are required to continue famine prevention activities in the coming months. For example, the shelter and non-food items cluster is funded at 11 per cent and the protection sector is funded at 16 per cent.

Humanitarian access constraints and operational implications

8. Humanitarian organizations continue to operate in a difficult and risk-prone environment. As in previous years, sustained humanitarian access remains a challenge owing to multiple factors, including denial of such access by non-State armed groups, insecurity, bureaucratic impediments and limited infrastructure. Staff safety is of particular concern. The first eight months of 2017 witnessed continued violence against humanitarian workers in hard-to-reach areas in southern and central Somalia. During that period, more than 110 violent incidences impacted humanitarian organizations, including the death of 4 humanitarian workers, injury of 10, physical assault on 3, arrest and temporary detention of 17 and abduction of 25. In comparison, more than 165 violent incidences in 2016 accounted for the deaths of 14 humanitarian workers, injury of 16, arrest and temporary detention of 25, abduction of 3 and physical assault on 5 . In accordance with trends recorded in previous years, frontline responders continue to be the most affected.

9. Active hostilities, including attacks by improvised explosive device in populated areas, continued to impact humanitarian operations in southern and central regions, in particular in Baidoa in the Bay region, Beledweyne in the Hiraan region, Gaalkacyo in the Mudug region, Kismaayo in the Juba Hoose region, and in Mogadishu. Indiscriminate attacks in populated places led to deaths and injuries of civilians, including humanitarian workers, and resulted in the destruction of humanitarian facilities. For example, on 2 January 2017, a twin vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack near Mogadishu airport severely damaged the offices of several humanitarian organizations in the Peace Hotel in Mogadishu and its proximity. At least three aid workers sustained injuries in the attack. On 25 January, a humanitarian health worker was killed in a similar attack on the Dayah Hotel in Mogadishu as the victim tried to attend to those injured. Two other aid workers were injured in the same attack, which left about 30 people dead. Two other humanitarian workers were also injured on 14 June during a complex attack on the Posh Hotel in Mogadishu.

10. During the reporting period, non-State armed groups reportedly engaged in relief efforts, distributing supplies, including food and non-food items, water, nutrition and medicines, to some of the estimated 2 million people in need in areas under their control. At the same time, a number of people residing in those areas in

Bakool, Bay, Galmudug, Gedo, Juba Hoose and Juba Dhexe and Shabelle Hoose fled mainly into internally displaced persons settlements in government-controlled areas, in search of humanitarian assistance.

11. Non-State armed actors further obstructed access by humanitarian organizations and government authorities through attacks, seizure of humanitarian supplies, abductions and extortion. The number of cases involving the abduction of humanitarian workers for ransom rose considerably compared to the past three years. By the end of August 2017, a total of 25 humanitarian workers, including 4 women, were abducted by non-State armed actors in the Bay, Gedo, Hiraan and Shabelle Hoose regions. In 2016, no cases of abduction for ransom had been recorded, while in 2015, one incident had been recorded. All the abducted humanitarian workers were Somali staff members and negotiations to secure their release were brokered by their respective clans. In order to secure their release, non-State armed actors charged ransoms in the form of cash as well as weapons and ammunition. Isolated incidents involving seizure of essential relief supplies intended for drought-affected people in hard-to-reach areas were also recorded in Bakool, Bay, Galguduud, Gedo and Shabelle Hoose.

12. Non-State armed actors also maintained blockades of towns in Bakool, Bay, Gedo and Hiraan and instated a new one on Marka in Shabelle Hoose in September 2016. That action impacted the ability of the humanitarian organizations to transport supplies by road. The blockades also restricted freedom of movement of the civilian population, including its ability to access essential commercial supplies. During the period in review, non-State armed groups escalated restrictions on public transport vehicles that use the Afgooye-Marka road and, in some cases, ambushed road users. For example, on 17 May, an armed group carjacked two vehicles transporting local products from Shabelle Hoose to Mogadishu.

13. As the drought crisis worsened in early 2017, local communities in areas affected by the blockade in parts of Bakool, Bay, Gedo and Shabelle Hoose initiated negotiations with non-State armed actors to allow access for humanitarian assistance and essential commercial supplies to their drought-stricken communities. Those efforts were, however, seldom successful and areas such as Dinsoor in the Bay region and Wajid and Xuddur in the Bakool region continued to experience mounting challenges to road access. Some members of the local communities resorted to desperate measures, including smuggling essential supplies into the affected towns with donkey carts. Several incidents were reported of such donkey carts being seized and burned. For example, on 13 March, non-State armed actors seized and burned down two donkey carts that were transporting food supplies to Diinsoor. On 21 May, in a third incident of its kind within a one-month period, non-State armed actors intercepted and burned donkey carts transporting food commodities at Tuugaar Hoose village, 18 kilometres north of Diinsoor in Bay.

14. The Somali National Armed Forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continued to provide armed escorts to some of the commercial transporters to support the delivery of essential supplies to communities in need, in spite of some challenges. On 9 June, through support provided by the Armed Forces and the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, Xuddur received over 20 commercial trucks carrying food supplies after 25 days of a blockade imposed by a non-State armed actor along the main supply route from Beledweyne through Qurac Joome. Previous attempts to reach the town with supplies were obstructed by ambushes and armed clashes. For example, in May, non-State armed actors ambushed commercial trucks transporting commodities from the Hiraan region. Prior to that incident, two trucks that were carrying food supplies into Xuddur had been burned. The ongoing interdiction of essential supplies destined for government-controlled areas continued

to make it difficult for assistance to reach the towns of Wajed in Bakool, Dinsoor and Qansaxdheere in Bay, Buulobarde in Hiraan and Garbaharey in Gedo.

15. The number of violent incidents associated with relief aid distributions also rose drastically in 2017. Over 33 incidents led to the deaths of 35 civilians and injury of 42 others, mainly in areas in the southern and central regions, in the contested Sool region in the north and in Somaliland. The majority of the casualties were internally displaced persons. Most of the armed violence occurred during looting or attempted looting incidents that were attributed to community members and to security forces guarding the relief supplies. The lack of proper crowd control modalities at distributions of bilateral aid donations was also a major contributing factor for the outbreaks of violence.

16. In addition to the drought that saw many of the water sources throughout the country dry up, the destruction of water wells by combatants to undermine opponents and/or perceived collaborators was particularly disturbing. For example, in January 2017, the destruction of water wells by airstrikes in the Ceel Waaq district left some pastoralist communities without access to safe water sources. The destruction of a water point at Waayo village in Afgooye on 26 January left many communities in Waayo Araq, Laanta Buur and Abdow villages without an alternative viable water source during a particularly dry period. The affected communities were left with no options other than moving to other areas in search of water.

17. The proliferation of money extortion checkpoints has continued to impact freedom of movement along all major access roads in southern and central Somalia. Varying amounts of money are charged by armed actors who man sections of the supply routes. The humanitarian community has continued to advocate with the Federal Government of Somalia, local authorities, AMISOM and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia to secure the main supply routes. Following concerted advocacy efforts, from the second quarter of 2017 to date, the Federal Government and several Federal states, including Galmudug, South-West state and Hirshabelle, have made milestone commitments and have started implementing some of the commitments to ensure that access routes are unblocked. Notably, on 8 May, the President of the Federal Government issued a directive to the Afgooye local authorities instructing the removal of illegal roadblocks along the major roads and calling for general reconciliation among the subclans inhabiting the district. The directive also ordered the suspension of tax collection within Afgooye town, with effect from 9 May 2017, for an unspecified duration. The Afgooye local authorities immediately implemented the suspension. Hirshabelle authorities in Shabelle Dhexe removed several illegal checkpoints between Mogadishu and Cadale town and committed themselves to preventing non-State armed actors from planting improvised explosive devices along the Jawhar-Balcad road. Illegal checkpoints were also removed along the Afgooye-Leego-Wanlaweyne road and Galmudug security forces, with support provided by community representatives, removed 10 illegal checkpoints imposed by armed militias near Godinlabe town in late May.

18. Troop realignment and reconfiguration by AMISOM and the Somali National Armed Forces continue to cause displacements and lead to disruption in humanitarian programming and delivery. The temporary takeovers of towns and subsequent troop withdrawals have left civilians and humanitarian organizations in the affected locations vulnerable and at risk of retaliatory attacks. Civilians remaining in these locations were reportedly subjected to retribution attacks, including apprehension, torture, killings and forced recruitments. For example, following the AMISOM withdrawal from Leego in Shabelle Hoose, on 5 August and the subsequent takeover of the town by non-State armed actors, a humanitarian organization that was running the town's health facility had two of its staff arrested,

medical and nutrition supplies and the health facility's furniture looted, and the facility occupied by the militants. Suspension, disruption and relocation of humanitarian programmes and withdrawal of humanitarian personnel linked to troop withdrawals and subsequent assumption of control of the areas by armed groups have been common during the reporting period.

19. In the absence of a centralized regulatory framework for NGOs and international organizations, disruptions, delays, intrusion in humanitarian facilities, arrests and detention of humanitarian workers, expulsion of humanitarian workers and temporary suspensions of humanitarian programmes continued to be experienced. During the first eight months of 2017, over 60 incidents were recorded throughout the country, including arbitrary taxation, multiple registration requests that included payment of multiple "registration fees", interferences in staff recruitments and contract award processes and taxation of humanitarian programme funds. Of particular concern is the increase in the number of humanitarian workers expelled from the country by the authorities and the delays in the clearance of essential humanitarian supplies at ports throughout the country. The seven expelled humanitarian personnel included both international and national staff. NGOs were more impacted compared to their United Nations counterparts. The humanitarian community continues to prioritize advocacy with the authorities to expedite the processes aimed at putting in place a centralized regulatory framework for NGOs and international organizations.

20. Despite the challenging operating environment in Somalia, humanitarian partners continue to expand their reach throughout the country. Over 257 humanitarian partners are involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in all 18 regions of the country. International organizations continue to contract local NGOs and community-based organizations to deliver assistance in areas where the international organizations have no access. In 2017, a broad range of actors, including local communities, stepped up to contribute to the famine prevention efforts and provided the first line of response, with support provided by local and federal authorities, business leaders, national and international humanitarian partners and charities.

Risk mitigation measures

21. The Somalia Humanitarian Fund is governed by global guidelines for country-based pooled funds in addition to the Fund's operational manual, which includes an accountability framework that outlines a set of robust risk management tools. Partners' capacity assessments are triangulated with project narrative, financial and audit reports and multiple-layer monitoring. Additional information is sourced from third-party contractors and other external sources, as well as from United Nations partners through the Risk Management Unit-convened risk management group. Altogether, this information is used to continuously assess partners' performance and to determine partners' risk levels and associated risks periodically. Furthermore, the operational manual prescribes the most appropriate funding modalities through a combined analysis of partner risk, project duration, budget amount and location of implementation to determine quality assurance measures for each project and the disbursement tranches and frequency of reporting, monitoring and financial spot checks. The existing guidance on managing possible fraud or misappropriation already facilitates amicable solutions on recovery of funds. However, seeking justice and recovering funds in more serious cases in the past, where criminal activity has been discovered, remains a challenge. The control and quality assurance measures in place have reduced the cases of possible fraud, with only three cases identified since 2013.

22. The Risk Management Unit established in 2011 provides the United Nations system and other development and humanitarian partners with the following services: facilitation, design and promotion of the adoption of the common risk management standards; provision of risk management advice; risk management training, monitoring services, maintenance and enhancement of contractors' information databases and information sharing and risk assessments and analysis for potential and existing partners. Risk assessments and analysis contain tailored recommendations designed to help agencies to address or mitigate a wide range of identified risks, including fiduciary, fraud, programme, integrity and reputational risks. The Unit continues to support the Office of Internal Oversight Services, as required, through its monitoring team and risk analysts. It developed and updated its Contractor Information Management System to enable the sharing of contract and risk-related information among the agencies of the United Nations system. As of 31 August 2017, the database contains information contributed by the Unit and 15 agencies on more than 3,875 contractors and suppliers to the United Nations in Somalia. The value of contracts covered therein amounts to about $4.7 billion. Regular updates relate to individuals and entities subject to Security Council sanctions, the World Bank exclusion list and the International Criminal Police Organization list of wanted persons for Somalia. Individuals and organizations identified in the reports by the Somalia/ Eritrea Monitoring Group are added to the database as and when required. The Unit also provides risk analysis and updates to the United Nations, World Bank and African Development Bank trust funds (Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility funds) in support of the implementation of the National Development Plan.

23. During the reporting period, the Risk Management Unit continued to regularly conduct risk management training sessions for a wide range of humanitarian organizations and other partners, including the Government and civil society. The Unit also shares information on high risk partners and collaborates with all relevant stakeholders to seek common approaches to risk management challenges and due diligence processes.

Impact of paragraphs 28 and 29 of resolution 2317 (2016)

24. Paragraph 28 of resolution 2317 (2016) provides that, until 15 November 2017, the measures imposed on Member States in paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008) shall not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia. While organizations surveyed for the present report did not explicitly comment on the impact of paragraphs 28 and 29 of resolution 2317 (2016) on their ability to implement programmes, the non-renewal of the humanitarian exemption would result in delays in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in areas controlled by non-State armed groups, which would put affected communities at risk of loss of lives and livelihoods and of exposure to suffering.

Conclusions

25. After close to three decades of turmoil, Somalia is currently on a positive trajectory towards peace and stability. When renewed risk of famine became apparent in early 2017, donors and operational humanitarian agencies acted early on to scale up the humanitarian response and to save lives. The extensive mobilization reflects unprecedented and timely international solidarity, which is in line with commitments made as part of the Grand Bargain at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. It also reflects persistent efforts by humanitarian organizations to reach

those in need, including in dangerous and insecure areas, to save lives and prevent the loss of livelihoods. Although large-scale famine has been averted to date, some communities in the most hard-to-reach areas in southern and central Somalia remain at risk of famine, and further efforts are required to ensure that the most vulnerable areas do not slip into famine in the coming months.

26. Humanitarian organizations active in Somalia continue to strike a balance between security concerns and ensuring effective service delivery under the principle of staying, protecting and delivering. Humanitarian partners also continue to seek to expand access where the needs are greatest, despite significant security challenges. The aforementioned efforts require flexible and timely funding to effectively provide assistance to millions of Somalis.

27. In the light of the foregoing, the Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator invites the Security Council to renew the humanitarian exemption provided for in paragraph 28 of its resolution 2317 (2016).